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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

When a check is tendered without condition and a

subsequent letter presumes to create a condition, is that
sufficient for an accord?
2.

When the letter creating the condition identifies the

total amount paid as undisputed invoice dates, is this sufficient
as an accord for dates that were disputed?
REFERENCE TO REPORT OF THE OPTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals opinion is reported at 1990 SL 69055.1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Court of Appeals filed its opinion May 24, 1990. No
petition for rehearing was filed, nor was any order entered
extending the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari.
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of
the Court of Appeals under the authority of Utah Code Ann.
Sections 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-2(5), and Rules 42-48 of the Rules
of the Utah Supreme Court.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF STATUTES, ETC.
There are no controlling provisions of constitutions,
statutes, ordinances, or regulations in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case

This is a civil action for collection of money for snow
1

This Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari will
refer the opinion reported as Estate Landscape v. Mountain States
Telephone, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 55 (Utah App. 1990), attached as
Appendix A.
1

removal services rendered under a written contract.
2.

Course of the Proceedings

Estate Landscape and Snow Removal, Inc. ("Estate") filed its
complaint on August 8, 1985, praying for damages of $30,162.50
(R. 2). Estate filed and Amended Complaint on May 16, 1986,
praying for damages of $21,549.50 (R. 24). On July 31, 1986, The
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell")
filed a motion for summary judgment based on the affirmative
defense of accord and satisfaction (R. 45), which the Court
(Judge Michael Murphy presiding) denied in a Summary Decision and
Order filed December 29, 1986 (R. 127). The case was tried to
the Court (Judge Timothy Hanson presiding) on January 12 and 13,
1988.
3.

Disposition in the Lower Courts

On April 1, 1988, the trial court entered judgment for
Estate.

Mountain Bell appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May

24, 1990, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for the
principal, but remanded for amendment of the judgment to exclude
compounded interest.
4.

Statement of Relevant Facts

Estate agrees to the rendition of facts presented by
Appellant with the following changes. With regard to the snow
reaching four (4) inches, it was determined by the trial court
that the term was ambiguous and that it meant plowing costs for
every four (4) inches.2 Exhibit 6 contained an itemized list of
2

Ruling of the Judge Hanson, Page 11, Lines 4 through 12.
2

dates and amounts that appellant disputed which when added
together was the exact amount demanded for by respondent in the
letter of July 23, 1985. (R. 84) Requests for admissions filed
by Appellant on October 28, 1986, admit that Appellant did
receive letters from Respondent dated June 25, 1985 and July 23,
1985. (R. 81-84)
ARGUMENT
OFFER OF UNRESTRICTED CHECK THAT REPRESENTED
THE UNDISPUTED BILLINGS DOES NOT AMOUNT TO
AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WHEN THAT CHECK
IS NEGOTIATED.
Appellant's argument supposes that there was a finding that
the check tendered by appellant was an offer of an accord. A
motion in limine was tendered to the trial court on the issue of
accord and satisfaction.

That motion was withdrawn so that

appellant had every opportunity to submit evidence to the court
on the accord and satisfaction defense.

The ruling by the court

on that issue was as follows:
The status of the evidence that Judge Murphy
considered in denying that motion for summary judgment,
that issue, and I note that it's not merely just a
motion for summary judgment denied, but, rather, he
goes into detail and identifies the law upon which he
relies and indicates for the record what the law is
that's applicable to the case at that point in time.
And while he denied the motion for a summary judgment,
I think it carries more weight than merely a minute
entry saying motion for summary judgment is denied. . .
And even if it were not the law of the case, and I
think this is equally as important, considering the
letter that was sent. I believe it was Plaintiffs 6.
in anv event the letter — the letter of June 14th.
Exhibit 6. considering that as a whole I can only
excise out that part. There are certainly difficulties
as to what it means.
But the long and short of it is I believe it falls
3

into that area of law that Judge Murphy identified as
being not in accord and satisfaction, and I agree with
that. And I see no reason to even consider changing it
even if it was not the law of the case, [emphasis
added]
The Trial court found that the letter that contained the
restrictive language did not rise to the level of an accord and
the Court of Appeals agreed.
Appellant relies on the cases of Marton Remodeling v.
JensenP 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985) and Cove View Excavating and
Construction Company v. FlynnP 758 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1988).
There is however a major distinction that Appellant has not
seemed to articulate to this Court.

In Marton Remodeling and

Cove View, the checks that were offered in full satisfaction of
those disputes had the language of accord written on the checks.
The would be accord in the case at bar was presented in a
separate document sent some time after the check.3

Thus almost

two (2) months had passed before appellant had made any attempt
to offer an accord to respondent.

The trial court before Judge

Murphy in the ruling of Summary Judgment dealt with this matter
under Marton Remodeling and viewed the separate dates of service
by respondent as separate and distinct parts that could not be
subject to a one time accord and therefore, was controled by the
decision in Dillman v. Massey Ferguson, Inc.,

13 Utah 2d 142,

Respondent received the June 1985 check on or about June
25, 1985 and did not receive the letter containing the alleged
accord until August 5, 1985. See Appendix C for admissions of
letter of June 25, 1985 and Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
page 4 for date of receipt of petitioner's letter.
4

369 P.2d 296 (1962).4

Judge Hanson stated in his conclusions of

law that:
1.
Based on the Court's Finding of Facts, it is
hereby concluded that there was no accord and
satisfaction in that the Order of Judge Michael R.
Murphy delineated the area fully and is the law of the
case. Even if it were not the law of the case. Exhibit
6 introduced into evidence did not fulfill the
requirements of an accord and satisfaction, [emphasis
added]
Prior to the appeal in this matter two trial court judges heard
all facts relevant to the accord and satisfaction defense and
both came to the same conclusion.

Judge Hanson's decision was

not just one of determining that Judge Murphy's ruling was the
law of the case, he also made the independent observation that
even if Judge Murphy had not ruled against the accord and
satisfaction defense Judge Hanson would have found that no accord
and satisfaction existed.

The trial court determined that the

letter did not amount to an accord the Court of Appeals determine
that there could be no assent to the accord based on the facts
presented.
The Court in Cove View stated that:
The elements essential to contracts generally must be
present in an accord and satisfaction, including an
offer and acceptance and a meeting of the minds, cases
cited
Id. at 476.

The Court of Appeals in the case at bar followed its

standards as set forth in Cove View by analyzing this matter to
determine if there was actually a contract present.
4

From the

Copy of full Summary Decision and Order set forth in
appendix flBff. (R. 127 - 131)
5

facts, an offer of $8,613.00 (EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTEEN
DOLLARS) was delivered to Respondent on or about June 25, 1985.
There was no offer of any kind submitted with the check of June
1985.5

On July 23, 1985, a letter was sent to Appellant stating

that the check was kept as partial payment on the outstanding
obligation and that a total sum of $21,549.50 (TWENTY-ONE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY NINE DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS) was
due.

(R. 84) The check was submitted unconditionally and was

accepted as such by the letter of July 23, 1985. Therefore, if
Appellant's subsequent letter received August 5, 1985 contained
additional terms it would not have any effect on the conditions
of the contract because what contract could have been made with
regard to the check of June 1985 was accepted on July 23, 1985
under the terms already stated.
The Court of Appeals stated that:
From Mountain Bell's point of view, the accord is
contained essentially in its letter of June 14, 1985,
to Estate Landscape. However, this letter is entirely
unilateral; there is no indication that Estate
Landscape accented to the letter as an accord. Its
signature on the check is not an ascent to an accord
not found on the face of the check as a restrictive
endorsement f where the party to whom the accord is
offered has expressly rejected the proposed accord
continued the dispute, and filed litigation to resolve
it adversarially in court. [emphasis added]
Estate Landscape v. Mountain States Telephone, 135 Utah Advance
Reports 55, 57 (Utah App. 1990).

The position of the Court of

Petitioner stated at page 4 of the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari "However, on or about June 21, 1985, rather than
delivering the check to the person holding the letter, Mountain
Bell's accounting department mailed the check directly to
Estate".
6

Appeals is that there was no assent to the accord by respondent.
The case was filed in August of 1985 and the check was not cashed
until October of 1985, litigation was pursued and no further
evidence was submitted by petitioner that the check was going to
be full settlement of the matter.

This would indicate that

petitioner understood the letter of July 23, 1985 and the filing
of the present action was an expressed refusal of any would be
accord.

As the Court of Appeals stated:

Estate Landscape acted within its rights in
cashing check as payment of the portion of its claim
that Mountain Bell agreed was owing; in fact, it may
have had a duty so to act in order to properly mitigate
its damages.
Id. at 57. The letter entered as exhibit 6 admits that
petitioner owed to respondent the amount of the check of June
1985.

Under URCP 56 respondent would have been entitled to

partial summary judgment on the amount not in dispute.

However,

by cashing the check and amending the complaint to reflect the
amount in dispute respondent performed the same task without
having to involve the court unnecessarily.

Based on the Court of

Appeals ruling respondent was probably under a duty to mitigate
its damages.

That damage would be the interest that would

accumulate on the principle of the amount not in dispute.

It is

conceivable that respondent could have lost approximately
$2,583.90 in interest by not cashing the check.6

The only way

^Amount calculated by taking the amount of the check
($8,613.00) and the legal rate of interest of 10% and multiplying
to obtain the amount due on the check for a period of 3 years.
(Date of Original Invoice and Date of Judgment 4/85 to 3/88)
7

to avoid the result is to do exactly what the Court of Appeals
suggested and cash the check.
In the analysis of this appeal the Court of Appeals did not
change its position found in Cove View nor did it decide the case
contrary to the Supreme Courts' decision in Marton Remodeling.
The facts found in the record of this case do not show any
payment by petitioner that had any condition that could be
classified as an accord to respondent.

Judge Murphy decided this

in the opinion of Summary Judgment, Judge Hanson decided this in
his ruling after trial on the entire matter, and the Court of
Appeals determined this after hearing the appeal. After 5 years
of litigation, two trial court judges and the Court of Appeals
decisions determining that no accord existed respondent requests
that this Court deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of August, 1990.

-~""~~David D. Lorfeman
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI was mailed
postage prepaid this 31st day of August, 1990, to:
Floyd A. Jensen, Esq.
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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Estate Landscape v. Mountain States TelephoneP
135 Utah Adv. Rep. 55 (Utah App. 1990)
Summary Decision and Order denying Mountain Bell's Motion
for Summary Judgment
Defendant's Responses to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions
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suppressed or destroyed evidence is
vital to the issues of whether the
defendant is guilty of the charge
and whether there is a fundamental
unfairness that requires the Court
to set aside the defendant's conviction.
State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101, 106 (Utah
1985).
Defendant argues that the evidence is material since if Karmelian actually identified
Webb rather than defendant as the robber,
such evidence would exculpate defendant. We
agree that the photo array should have been
preserved for potential exculpatory purposes.
However, defendant was also positively identified in court by Church, who viewed the
robber in the store at close range and who was
not shown any photos of defendant prior to
trial. Since the photos were not the sole source
for a finding of defendant's guilt, we find
that the destroyed photos lacked materiality in
the constitutional sense.

ISSUES RAISED IN DEFENDANT'S PRO
SE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
Following careful consideration of the arguments raised in defendant's pro se supplemental brief, we conclude that they are meritless and that discussion of them is unnecessary. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 88889 (Utah 1989).
SENTENCE
Finally, we address an issue not raised by
defendant, but by the State, "in adherence to
its duty to promote justice." State v. Bartley,
124 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 44 (Ct. App. 1989).
Based on the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation in State v. Willett, 694 P.2d 601 (Utah
1984), of the firearm enhancement statute as
providing for a maximum enhancement term
of five years, the State concedes that the trial
court abused its discretion by imposing a sixyear firearm enhancement term. As in Webb,
131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 53-54, we direct the
trial court upon remand to reduce the enhancement sentence for use of a firearm in the
commission of aggravated robbery from six
years to a total of five years.
Affirmed, with instructions to correct the
sentence.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. There is no apparent reason for defendant submitting a motion in support of the alleged interests
of his codefendam, Webb.
2. In Webb, we assumed without deciding that for
purposes of a sixth amendment analysis of a claim
of ineffectiveness of counsel, two law partners or
associates are considered one attorney. Id. at 54-55
n.3 (citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 S. Ct.

55

3114, 3120 (1987)); see also Martinez v. Sullivan,
881 F.2d 921,930 (10th Cir. 1989).
3. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) provides a procedure for protecting a defendant's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
where two or more defendants have been jointly
charged or are to be jointly tried, and are represented by the same counsel. The rule provides that
the court shall promptly inquire with
respect to such joint representation and
shall personally advise each defendant of
his right to the effective assistance of
counsel, including separate representation. Unless it appears that there is good
cause to believe no conflict of interest is
likely to arise, the court shall take such
measures as may be appropriate to
protect each defendant's right to
counsel.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(c).
The notes of the advisory committee on rules state
that "{ujnder rule 44(c), an inquiry is called for
when the joined defendants are represented by the
same attorney and also when they are represented by
attorneys 'associated in the practice of law." Fed.
R. Crim. P. 44 advisory committee notes, 1979
amendment (emphasis added). The particular measures to be taken in this inquiry are not set forth in
the rule, but are left to the court's discretion. Id.
At least one state court requires an inquiry when
multiple defendants are to be represented by separate public defenders from the same office. See
State v. Bell, 90 N.J. 163, 447 A.2d 525, 530 (1982).
In order to avoid claims such as raised herein, it
would be beneficial if, when codefendants are represented separately by public defenders, Utah trial
courts utilized a similar procedure, by obtaining an
on record consent to the representation. This practice would clarify that a defendant has considered
and waived possible conflicts of interests. Given the
"conflicts of interests (that] could arise when office
associates represent co-defendants," BareIIa, 714
P.2d at 289, there may be benefits in having defendant's consent a matter of record. Such a practice
should not, however, preclude the obligation of a
trial court to sever joint representation if an actual
conflict were to arise.

Cite as
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ESTATE LANDSCAPE AND SNOW
REMOVAL SPECIALISTS, INC.,
Plaintiff And Appellee,
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND
TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 880428-CA
FILED: May 24, 1990
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Salt Lake County, Third District,
Honorable Michael R. Murphy and Timothy
R. Hanson.
ATTORNEYS:
Floyd A. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
David D. Loreman and Lowell V,
Summerhays, Murray, for Appellee
Before Judges Davidson, Jackson, and
Larson.1
OPINION
LARSON, Judge:
This is an action seeking to collect amounts
alleged to be due under a contract for snow
removal services rendered by Estate Landscape
and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. (Estate
Landscape). Defendant Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company (Mountain
Bell) appeals from a judgment in favor of
Estate Landscape.
Estate Landscape and Mountain Bell entered
into a written contract which provided that
Estate Landscape would remove snow from
certain buildings occupied by Mountain Bell in
return for payment at a specified rate. Estate
Landscape performed its work suitably, and
billed Mountain Bell twice, once for work
through December 27 and again at the end of
the snow season.2 The billing separately listed
each snow removal item by date.
Mountain Bell paid the first bill, but considered the $30,162.90 total of the second bill
to be excessive for the services at its Alta
office. It therefore sent Estate Landscape a
check for only $8,613. The check did not
contain a restrictive endorsement or a waiver
on its face. Upon receipt of the check, Estate
Landscape responded by acknowledging
partial payment and requesting the balance
remaining, but Mountain Bell refused to pay
the balance. Next, Mountain Bell sent Estate
Landscape a letter3 explaining its position
concerning the bill for the Alta office. According to the letter, the contract for the Alta
office provided that Estate Landscape would
remove snow when it reached a depth of four
inches. From snowfall records for Alta, it
appeared that Estate Landscape had billed for
snow removal on days when the snowfall was
less than four inches. On the basis of the
snowfall records, therefore, Mountain Bell
refused to pay for snow removal on certain
days for which Estate Landscape had charged
for its services. The letter specifically detailed
all contested snow removal services by date.
Mountain Bell's letter concluded:
Based on the above identified
billing discrepancies we have enclosed4 a check for $8613.00 which is
payment in full for satisfaction of

CODE• CO
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contracted services. If you are not willing to accept that sum, $8613.00
in full satisfaction of sums due, DO
NOT negotiate the check, for upon
your negotiation of that check, we
will treat the matter as fully paid.
(Emphasis in original).
When Estate Landscape received the letter,
the check it had earlier received from Mountain Bell had not been cashed. Estate Landscape responded to Mountain Bell's letter by
commencing this action against Mountain Bell.
Initially, Estate Landscape complained for the
entire $30,162.90 of its second bill for the
winter of 1984-85. About two weeks after
filing suit, Estate Landscape endorsed the
check from Mountain Bell and cashed it, then
amended its complaint against Mountain Bell
to seek only the difference between the
amount of the check and the amount billed.
Mountain Bell moved for summary judgment on the grounds that its letter and check
tendered to Estate Landscape were an accord
and satisfaction of its obligation under the
snow removal contract. The district court, per
Judge Michael R. Murphy, denied the motion,
noting that Mountain Bell admitted that it
owed the amounts tendered in the check. The
case proceeded to trial before the bench.
At trial, Judge Timothy R. Hanson considered the earlier denial of summary judgment
to have resolved the question of accord and
satisfaction, and granted judgment to Estate
Landscape for the amount of its bill, less
certain charges for work not mentioned in the
contract. The judgment included interest accruing before judgment, compounded annually.
Mountain Bell appeals.
Factual Standard of Review in Summary
Judgment
Mountain Bell now argues that the trial
court erred in treating its motion for summary
judgment as dispositive of its accord and satisfaction defense and thereafter refusing to
reopen that issue at trial on the grounds that it
was law of the case. Mountain Bell argues that
the combined effect of the dispositive
summary judgment and the refusal to try the
issue was an unfairly skewed view of the facts
in the district court. Mountain Bell argues that
the court views the facts for summary judgment purposes in a light unfavorable to the
moving party, and therefore, because the
summary judgment was treated as conclusive
against the movant, the movant here, Mountain Bell, never had a chance for a fair view of
the facts on the issue.
Mountain Bell, however, is not precisely
correct in thus describing a court's factual
viewpoint in deciding a motion for summary
judgment. Although it may be true for most
summary judgments that the court views the
facts in favor of the nonmovant, that formulation takes into account only perhaps the

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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most common outcomes of a motion for
summary judgment, in which the moving party
either receives the judgment it seeks, or all
judgment is denied and the issue reserved for
further consideration. However, in this case,
Mountain Bell moved for summary judgment,
and its motion was denied on the merits, and
that denial effectively disposed of Mountain
Bell's accord and satisfaction defense.5 Later,
that disposition was regarded as the law of the
case, and the accord and satisfaction issue was
not reopened.*
Recognizing that the party adversely affected by the summary judgment has not had an
opportunity for trial, the court views the facts
in the light most favorable to that party.7 In
situations in which summary judgment is
granted, the party adversely affected would be
the party who did not move for summary
judgment. If summary judgment is denied on
the merits and a claim or defense of the
movant thereby eliminated, then the facts are
viewed in the light most favorable to the
moving party. Summary judgment may also be
denied without reaching the merits of any
claim or defense, often because the court
cannot reconcile the material elements of the
parties' versions of the facts, and thus cannot
grant a summary judgment under Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(c).1 Since any material difference in
the parties' versions of the facts will preclude
summary judgment, the shadings of light in
which the facts are viewed cannot make a
substantial difference in the result, even if the
shading applied is erroneous.
In this case, Mountain Bell was the movant
for summary judgment on the accord and
satisfaction issue. The district court's memorandum decision on Mountain Bell's motion
was clearly intended to lay the defense of
accord and satisfaction to rest. Since a defense
of Mountain Bell's was thereby eliminated,
the facts should be viewed in the light favorable to Mountain Bell. The record does not
explicitly note whether the district court thus
viewed the facts; however on appeal, we view
the facts supporting a summary judgment
through the same lens filter as the trial court.*
Therefore, since the issue of correctness of the
summary judgment on its merits is before us,
we proceed to review it in the light most favorable to Mountain Bell.
Lack of an Accord
In denying summary judgment on the
merits, the district court reasoned that the
contract for snow removal in this case was
severable, and that the scope of the accord
was therefore limited to only part of the contract. According to this reasoning, the accord
and satisfaction did not fully discharge the
contract.,f
Identifying which claim or claims are the
subject of an accord and satisfaction depends
on the manifested intent of the parties.11

e-
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52
However, before we can determine the contractual intent of the parties, we must have a
contract. There is no contractual intent to be
discovered where there has been no mutual
assent. In this case, the mutual assent for the
would-be accord is lacking.12
From Mountain Bell's point of view, the
accord is contained essentially in its letter of
June 14, 1985, to Estate Landscape. However,
this letter is entirely unilateral; there is no
indication that Estate Landscape assented to
the letter as an accord. Its signature on the
check is not an assent to an accord not found
on the face of the check as a restrictive endorsement,13 where the party to whom the
accord is offered has expressly rejected the
proposed accord, continued the dispute, and
filed litigation to resolve it adversarial!) in
court. It is therefore apparent that an accord
was offered, a check tendered in anticipation
that an accord would be reached, and a letter
sent indicating what Mountain Bell intended
and would do if the check were negotiated,
but there is no indication of Estate Landscape's assent to the accord. Even in the light
most favorable to Mountain Bell, the evidence
simply falls short of demonstrating Estate
Landscape's acceptance of Mountain Bell's
offer to settle the account. It would, perhaps,
be possible to offer an accord and provide in
the offer that cashing an accompanying check
would be acceptance of the offer, since the
offeror can, within reason, specify the act that
shall constitute acceptance.,4 However, the
offeree can also reject the offer, after which
there is nothing left to accept. We believe that
the telephone conference continuing the
dispute and the filing of litigation amount to a
rejection of the offered accord. After the litigation was underway, there remained the
question of what to do with Mountain Bell's
tendered check in Estate Landscape's possession. Estate Landscape acted within its rights
in cashing check as payment of the portion of
its claim that Mountain Bell agreed was
owing; in fact, it may have had a duty so to
act in order to properly mitigate its damages.
Thus, even if we resolve any immaterial
factual doubt in Mountain Bell's favor, this
appears to be a situation in which one party
asserts an accord to which the other party, for
all that appears, never agreed. In such a case,
accord and satisfaction is not a defense for
lack of a binding accord.
Compounding of Interest
Mountain Bell's final argument is that, even
if it is liable for the amount of the judgment,
the interest on the judgment should not have
been compounded. The general rule is that
simple, not compound, interest accrues on a
judgment, unless the parties contract otherwise,15 which they have not in this case, or
unless the statute providing for interest on
judgments expressly requires compounding,
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which ours docs not.
This rule against compound interest on
judgments is consistent with the genera! judicial disfavor of interest on interest.17 It is also
of long standing and forms part of the backdrop against which the Legislature has statutorily provided for interest on judgments. We
see no compelling reason to alter this longstanding gloss on the judgment interest tatute.11
We therefore decline the invitation to engraft
onto the statute judicial discretion to allow
compound interest" and reverse as to the
award of compound interest.
Except in regard to the interest provided in
the judgment, the trial court's decision is
affirmed. We vacate the provisions of the
judgment relating to interest and remand for
amendment of the judgment to provide for
simple, rather than compound, interest.
John Farr Larson, Judge

CODE• CO
Provo, Utah

party has had a fair opportunity to address the
grounds for the adverse judgment. See Bonilla v.
Nazario, 843 F.2d 34. 37 (1st Cir. 1988). A careful
practitioner would therefore File a cross-motion in
an appropriate case, to avoid concerns over the
adequacy of the movant's opportunity to address all
of the material issues. In this case, the district court,
and this court as well, hold that Mountain Bell
failed to carry its burden in establishing an accord.
Mountain Bell bore in essence that same burden
both in seeking summary judgment in its favor and
in avoiding an adverse summary judgment. We
therefore conclude that it had ample opportunity to
establish an accord but has not succeeded in doing
so.
6. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands A Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d
735, 736 (Utah 1984); SaJf Lake City Corp. v. James
Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988); Conder v. A.L. Williams A Assocs.,
739 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); see also
State v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1989)
(extraordinary intervening circumstances justifying
I CONCUR:
reconsideration of a decided issue).
7. See Branham v. Provo School Dist., 780 P.2d 810
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
(Utah 1989); Blue Cross A Blue Shield v. State, 779
P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis
1. John Farr Larson. Senior Juvenile Court Judge, Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 299 (Utah 1987); Lanti
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah v. National Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937
Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989).
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
2. The contract required monthly statements, rather 8. Because a summary judgment motion can be
than a single statement at the end of the season. denied for at least two reasons, either because judMountain Bell claimed that Estate's failure to gment is not merited or because factual issues preproyide monthly billings was a breach, but the trial clude a grant of summary judgment, a trial court
court found that the breach was not material, and decision denying summary judgment should be
thus, it did not excuse Mountain Bell from its obli- expressed in a brief, written statement, identifying
gations. See Niehon v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293, the grounds for denying summary judgment. See
1297 (Utah 1982); Darrell J. Diderickscn A Sons, Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). In part because of the tentInc. v. Magna Water and Sewer Improvement Dist., atively slanted view on the facts, Findings are not
613 P.2d 1116. 1119 (Utah 1980); 4 A. Corbin. Corbin ordinarily made in resolving a motion for summary
on Contracts §946 (1951). That finding is judgment, even if the motion is resolved on the
not contested on appeal.
merits. The main purpose of Findings is to resolve
3. The check for $8,613 was to have been sent with material factual issues, Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 737
the letter; however. Mountain Bell's accounting P.2d 996 (Utah 1987), and summary judgment
department mailed the check without the letter. cannot be granted if such issues exist. See Taylor v.
Upon learning that the check had already been Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 168 (Utah Ct. App.
mailed. Mountain Bell sent its letter, which reached 1989). Moreover, since the favorable factual viewEstate Landscape before it cashed the check from point applied for summary judgment purposes is
Mountain Bell. Estate Landscape admits that it valid only for the motion at hand, the Finality attrknew that the letter was in reference to the check it ibuted to Findings would perhaps tend to give too
had received from Mountain Bell but had not as yet general a validity to a view of the facts that is enticashed.
rely ad hoc.
4. Note that the check was not enclosed, but rather 9. Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821,
had erroneously been sent earlier. Estate Landscape 824 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 127 Utah
admitted, however, that it recognized that the letter Adv. Rep. 38 (1990).
referred to the check it had earlier received from 10. See Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc.,
Mountain Bell.
18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966); Dillman v.
5. This course of action was not erroneous. See Massey Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d
National Expositions v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 296 (1962); cf. Marion Remodeling v. Jensen, 706
824 F.2d 131. 133 (1st Cir. 1987); British Caledo- P.2d 6097, 608-09 (Utah 1985); Allen-Howe
nian Airways Ltd. v. First State Bank, 819 F.2d Specialties v. U.S. Constr., Inc., 611 P.2d 705 (Utah
593, 595 (5th Cir. 1987); Pueblo of Santa Ana v. 1980). While we recognize that Mountain Bell's
Mountain States Tel. A Tel Co., 734 F.2d 1402, letter may have had the effect of severing the cont1408 (10th Cir. 1984), reversed on other grounds, ract, we do not reach that question, because, for
All U.S. 237 (1985); Giovanelli v. First Fed. Savs. A lack of mutual assent, there was no contract to be
Loan Ass% 120 Ariz. 577, 587 P.2d 763, 768 severed.
(1978); 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal 11. Quealy v. Anderson, 714 P.2d 667, 669 (Utah
Practice and Procedure §2720 at 29-35 1986) ("The scope of an accord and satisfaction is
(1983); 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's determined by the intention of the parties ...."); see
Federal Practice 156.12 (1987).
Petersen v. Petersen, 709 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1985).
in the absence of a cross-motion, the trial court 12. We therefore afFirm, but for a reason differing
should, on its own initiative, assure that the moving somewhat from the trial court's grounds for its
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13? Utah A*
decision. See Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 $8,613 check was tendered by Mountain Bell
(Utah 1988).
with the following condition attached, with the
13. Cf. Cove View Excavating A Constr. Co. v. emphasis in the original:
Flynn, 758 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), in which
Based on the above identified
the acceptance of the accord was effected by negobilling discrepancies (sic] we have
tiating a check bearing an assent to the accord on its
enclosed a check for $8613.00 which
face.
14. Crane v. Timberbrook Village, Ltd., 774 P.2d 3,
is payment in full for satisfaction of
4 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
contracted services. If you are not
15. See Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Nealc,
willing to accept that sum, $8613,00
783 P.2d 551, 554-55 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
in full satisfaction of sums due, DO
(construing a note as not providing for compound
NOT negotiate the check, for upon
interest).
your
negotiation of that check, we
16. See Utah Code Ann. §15-1-4 (1987); 47
will treat the matter as fully paid.
C.J.S. Interest and Usury §24 (1982).
17. Watkins & Faber v. Whiteley, 592 P.2d 613, 616 This language clearly asserts a dispute over
(Utah 1979); Mountain States Broadcasting Co., 783 billing discrepancies, states three times that
P.2dat555.
$8,613 is being tendered as full payment, and
18. See Hackford v. Utah Power Si Light Co., 740 warns against negotiating the check. What
P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah 1987).
more could Mountain Bell say to set up an
19. See Stroud v. Stroud, 758 P.2d 905 (Utah 1988), offer of accord and satisfaction? Although the
afVg 738 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
offer was found in Mountain Bell's letter, not
on the check itself, Estate Landscape admitted
JACKSON, Judge (dissenting):
knowing that the express conditions in the
The decision and order on summary judg- letter related to the $8,613 check, which it had
ment was entered in this case on December 29, received separately but had not yet negotiated.
1986. The order denied Mountain Bell's A creditor may not disregard the condition
motion, which asserted the affirmative defense attached to a check tendered in full payment
of accord and satisfaction. The motion judge, of a disputed claim. Cove View, 758 P.2d at
who did not have before him our recent deci- 478 (citing Marton Remodeling, 706 P.2d at
sions in Cove View Excavating and Constr. 609). Although the majority mysteriously finds
Co. v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. "no indication" of Estate Landscape's assent
1988), and Masonry Equipment & Supply v. to the offer of accord, negotiation of the
Willco Assocs., Inc., 755 P.2d 756 (Utah Ct. $8,613 check was itself a conclusive manifesApp. 1988), ruled that "this case is controlled tation of assent, resulting in an accord and
by Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d satisfaction as a matter of law regardless of its
607 (Utah 1985)/ But the springboard for the subjective intent. See id.
judge's legal analysis was that each separate
Estate Landscape negotiated the check. That
day of work pursuant to the written contract is the end of the matter. I would reverse.
constituted a separate claim. The court exprNorman H. Jackson, Judge
essed "[reluctance) to suggest that more than
one claim exists in circumstances where the
dispute arises under a single written contract,"
but felt compelled by Marton to do so.
Cite as
The motion judge stated, "In resolving this
135 Utah Adv. Rep. 59
matter, the court cannot artificially bifurcate a
single dispute in determining" whether there
IN T H E
had been an accord and satisfaction. Contrary
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
to that statement, the court did more than
bifurcate the claim. The court treated the Paul Edmond HAUMONT,
matter as one of multiple claims, i.e., each
Plaintiff and Appellant,
day's work was a claim. Thus, he considered
the work on each of the thirty-one disputed Mickie Jean Arnold Evans HAUMONT,
days to support a separate claim for relief. I
Defendant and Appellee.
consider that premise untenable.
While the lower court did not have the No. 880655-CA
benefit of Cove View and Masonry Equip- FILED: May 24, 1990
ment, my colleagues do. They have nonetheless elected to completely ignore those opin- Sixth District, Kane County
ions-as well as the lower court's reliance Honorable Don V. Tibbs
on Marton, a decision the majority opinion
tucks away in a footnote-and engage in a ATTORNEYS:
Kent M. K as ting, Salt Lake City, for
"mutual assent" analysis.
Appellant
1 would rely on Cove View, where, as in this
case, the parties simply disagreed over the
total amount to be paid on a contract. The
UTAH
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SUMMARY DECISION

in its letter of June 14, 1985 that it would not pay for snow
removal on the specified dates when weather records indicated
snow accumulations of less than four inches.

No other basis

for disputing the claims exist in the record before this court
on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

There is no dispute

that the amounts tendered were in fact owed in accordance with
the terms of the contract.
This case is controlled by Marton Remodeling v. Jensen,
706 P. 2d 607 (Utah 1985).

In applying Marton Remodeling to

the case at bar it is necessary to determine whether the plaintiff's
original assertions constituted a single claim.

In resolving

this matter, the court cannot artificially bifurcate a single
dispute in determining whether the purported accord and satisfaction
extinguished all of plaintiff's claims.

Generally, the court

would be reluctant to suggest that more than one claim exists
in circumstances where the dispute arises under a single written
contract. This case, however, is controlled by contrary precedent.
The Supreme Court in Marton Remodeling set forth two examples
of circumstances where the dispute involved more than one claim.
It did so by citing with approval its decisions in Bennett v. Robinson fs Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966),
and Dillman v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d
296 (1962).
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SUMMARY DECISION

Whereas there are other factors not referenced, in this
Summary Decision and Order supporting denial of summary judgment
(e.g., intent, consideration, date of acceptance of payment,
and the reasonable expectations of the parties) , the Dillman
case, in light of its interpretation and approval in Marton
Remodeling, alone requires denial of defendant's Motion.
For the reasons set forth herein, defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is denied.
Dated this

29th

day of December, 1986.

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

G00130
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to the following, this
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day of December, 19861

James W. Carter
Attorney for Plaintiff
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Ut h 84111
Floyd A. Jensen
Attorney for Defendant
250 Bell Plaza, 16th *
,r
Salt Lake City, Utah -.111
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(1(101.11
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Admissions

FLOYD A. JENSEN, Attorney,
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE.
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 237-6409
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Plaintiff,
Civil No, C85-5197
v s.

MOui* . . .
TELL^RArn tur

^PHQNE AND

HONORABLE PHILIP F
FISH I .E^

Defendant.

Defervta:*
^

. -

^

K;,]ue.

I I >n n t a i n S t a t e s
\*b\ ni"is

Telpphonp
'u

and

i i J 4' , r i
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Set

i : AdiMSSionr as follows:

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION MO, 1: Admi t that Exhibit "A"
attached hereto is a true and correct copy of a letter
received by Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company
from counsel fot Estate Landscape and Snow Removal
Special i ^ T
\ :-s
RESPONSE:
REQUEST ir'JR ADMISSION NQ t 2 i Admit that Exhibit "B"
attached hereto is a true and correct copy of a letter
received by Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company
from counsel f-^- Estate Landscape and Snoi * Removal

"H0081

RESPONSE:

Admits.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3:

Admit that suit in the

instant matter was filed on or about August 8, 1985.
RESPONSE;

Mountain Bell does not have knowledge as to

the exact filing date of plaintiff's Complaint, however.
Mountain Bell admits that it was served with the Complaint
on August 13, 1985.
DATED this 30th day of June, 1986.
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY

By

^Vr-4J.
/ uv n ' v^yt

* *-*-* ——..

Floyck A. Jensen, Attorney
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Mountain States Telephone and Teleqraph f'o""piinY
4747 North Seventh Street
Room 212
Phoenix, Arizona
85014
j
Dr.'ci i

Estate Landscape and Maintenance c now Removal
Contract SUTD010

.";') i f b :

We have been requested by Estate! Landscape a:;r
moval
Specialists to assist them in collecting amounts due . ^
- srew
removal contract with you dated December 1, 1984, b> which H ' a t e
Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists was to perform snow
removal service s fo r Mount a in Re1
1 M f a Ha i•> i " > Lit tie
Cottonwool Canv.-cand tnat you have been invoiced for a total fee of
$?
f which $23,162.50 remains outstanding to date. We
would appreciate hearing from you at ^LUL ear 1* est
convenience
•h regard * »
- * *-<* to take care * :/ ** i ;• cc^tanding
anee. If W P
"u1 d from you within ten \\"
days of
ceipt < f t
I * <i; , we have beer instructed U Droceed
: emedies.
Ve*
r

'.FALOtKI, KIJ*GHCF'* k PETERS

V Jam
lines

fwiM.nnn

KAPALOSKI, K I N G H O R N &

PETERS

A T T O R N E Y S A T LAW
• KXCHANOB PLACS. SUITS lOOO
8 A L T LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 1
,KE KAPALOSKI
iERALD H. KlNQHORN. P.C.

TELEPHOKS 801 864-8644

JILX T H O M A S P R T K R S
IREQORT L. P R O B S T

July 23, 1985

f A R Y ELXJEN S L O A N

AMX8 W. CABTBR

Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company
4747 North 7th Street
Room 212
Phoenix, Arizona 85014
Re:

Estate Landscape and Maintenance Snow Removal

Dear Sirs:
We have been requested by Estate Landscape and Snow Removal
Specialists to assist them in collecting amounts due under a snow
removal contract with you dated December 1, 1984, by which Estate
Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists was to perform snow
removal services for Mountain Bell at Alta Main in Little
Cottonwood Canyon, among other localities.
We understand that the outstanding balance due Estate
Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists as of April 1, 1985, was
the sum of $30,162.50.
Estate Landscape and Snow Removal
Specialists is in receipt of a check in the amount of $8,613.00
which check has not yet been cashed and which is being held as
partial payment of the outstanding obligation. Accordingly, we
hereby make demand upon you for payment in the sum of $21,54 9.50,
which amount should be received in our offices within ten (10)
days of your receipt of this letter. In the absence of such
payment, we have been instructed to proceed with all available
civil remedies to settle this outstanding account. Please govern
yourselves accordingly.
Very truly yours,
HORN & PETERS

JWC:gh

r\t\r\r\c5,%

